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1 
 
Cost Overruns in Transportation Infrastructure Projects: 1 
Sowing the Seeds for a Probabilistic Theory of Causation 2 
 3 
Abstract:  Understanding the cause of cost overruns in transportation infrastructure projects has been a topic that has 4 
received considerable attention from academics and the popular press.  Despite studies providing the essential building 5 
blocks and frameworks for cost overrun mitigation and containment, the problem still remains a pervasive issue for 6 
Governments worldwide. The interdependency that exists between ‘causes’ that lead to cost overruns materializing 7 
have largely been ignored when considering the likelihood and impact of their occurrence.  The vast majority of the 8 
cost overrun literature has tended to adopt a deterministic approach in examining the occurrence of the phenomenon; 9 
in this paper a shift towards the adoption of pluralistic probabilistic approach to cost overrun causation is proposed.  10 
The establishment of probabilistic theory incorporates the ability to consider the interdependencies of causes so to 11 
provide Governments with a holistic understanding of the uncertainties and risks that may derail the delivery and 12 
increase the cost of transportation infrastructure projects. This will further assist in the design of effective mitigation 13 
and containment strategies that will ensure future transportation infrastructure projects meet their expected costs as 14 
well as the need of taxpayers.  15 
 16 
Keywords: Infrastructure, cost overrun, causal reasoning, probabilistic causation, mechanisms, dependencies 17 
 18 
1. Introduction 19 
Investment in transport infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, ports, railways) is required to meet the 20 
growing needs of an increasing population, as well as to sustain a competitive advantage in the 21 
global marketplace.  For an economy to position itself to capitalize on growth and increased 22 
investment due to a burgeoning population and increasing international demand for goods and 23 
services, greater investment in transportation infrastructure is needed.  In Australia, for example, 24 
it has been forecasted that over the next two decades the number of trucks on its roads will increase 25 
by 50%, rail freight by two-thirds and shipping containers through ports will double; international 26 
and domestic travel through capital city airports will double; and technology will play a significant 27 
role in meeting the needs of transport, while also improving safety (Australian Federal 28 
Government, 2014a).  Yet history explicitly indicates the capital expenditure (CAPEX) of 29 
transportation infrastructure projects routinely overrun their initial cost estimates leaving asset 30 
owners, financiers, contractors and the public dissatisfied (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007; 31 
Love et al., 2015).  This is not an unusual situation for infrastructure projects, as it has been 32 
observed that on average, 48% of them fail to meet their baseline time, cost and quality objectives 33 
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(Caravel Group, 2013).  Well-known Australian projects that have attracted the attention of the 34 
popular press due to cost overruns include the Melbourne’s Southern Cross Railway Station, 35 
Sydney Cross City Tunnel, Brisbane’s RiverCity Motorway and the M7 Clem Jones Tunnel. 36 
 37 
If the CAPEX of a project overruns, then the scope of works in others being considered or 38 
undertaken by Government’s may be reduced to accommodate the increased expenditure. 39 
Moreover, contractors could face cash flow issues, liquidity and damage to their business image 40 
while the public has to pay more when the taxpayer funds projects.  This may also have a knock-41 
on effect on the funds available for maintaining and operating the asset. For Governments, 42 
managing the cost performance of their portfolio of transportation infrastructure projects is 43 
essential for ensuring the economic competitiveness and wealth for its constituents; it is a critical 44 
metric, as it quantifies the cost efficiency of the work completed.  Cost performance is generally 45 
defined as the value of the work completed compared to the actual cost or progress made on the 46 
project (Baccarini and Love, 2014).  Thus, the ability to reliably estimate the final cost of 47 
construction is vital for maintaining the planning and resourcing in other projects or those in the 48 
pipeline.  An issue that has been overlooked is the cost overrun that often materializes during the 49 
operation and maintenance of the asset that is constructed.  Often transportation projects are 50 
delivered using Public Private Partnerships or variants thereof, though during operations and 51 
maintenance the private sector will generally be responsible managing the asset.   52 
 53 
Put simply, a cost overrun is traditionally defined as the ratio of the actual final costs of the project 54 
to the estimate made at full funds authorization measured in escalation-adjusted terms (Merrow, 55 
2011).  In this instance, a cost overrun is treated as the margin between the authorized initial project 56 
cost and the real final costs incurred after adjusting for expenditures due to escalation terms.  While 57 
not always the case, cost overruns are often accompanied by schedule overruns as well so that the 58 
Government tends to be subjected to a ‘double whammy’. The Edinburgh Trams project in 59 
Scotland (discussed in more detail in Section 2.2 below) is an apt example. Cost and schedule 60 
overruns are not mutually exclusive as they have similar causes though the strategies for mitigating 61 
their consequences can be significantly different.  62 
 63 
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Despite the considerable amount of research that has been undertaken, cost overruns are a 64 
pervasive problem (e.g. Vidalis and Najafi, 2004; Cantarelli et al, 2012a,b,c; Odeck et al., 2015; 65 
Love et al. 2015; Verjweij et al., 2015). While such studies providing the essential building blocks 66 
to better understand and provide a much-needed stimulus for theory that can be used to explain 67 
cost overrun causation, they still remain a ubiquitous and on-going issue (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 68 
2002; Bordat et al., 2004; Odeck, 2004; Flyvbjerg et al., 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007; Cantarelli et al, 69 
2012a,b,c; Love et al., 2015b).  If cost overruns are to be mitigated, then there is a need to be able 70 
to determine whether a set of events or propositions can be validated and their causal relationships 71 
can be accepted as being true; at present, neither can be corroborated.  With this in mind, this paper 72 
briefly reviews the normative literature and proposes that research should focus on developing a 73 
probabilistic theory of cost overrun causation.  74 
 75 
2.1 Cost Overruns: Points of Conjecture 76 
Reported cost overruns have been found to vary significantly between studies in various countries 77 
ranging, for example, from -11 to 106% (Pickrell, 1990), -59% to 183% (Odeck, 2004), and -12% 78 
and 70% (Love et al., 2014). A primary reason for the disparity between studies is the ‘point of 79 
reference’ from which the cost overrun is measured. Within the planning fraternity, cost overruns 80 
have been generally determined as the difference between initial forecast and actual construction 81 
costs (Cantarelli et al., 2012a).  Between the initial forecast of construction costs and the 82 
commencement of construction, several estimates will be prepared and refined before being lodged 83 
for approval. Odeck (2004) has however, suggested that the reference point for determining a cost 84 
overrun should be at the detailed planning stage where design, specification and final cost are 85 
determined. The use of the aforementioned different reference points provides varying results, in 86 
the case of road projects for example, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) provides a mean cost overrun of 20% 87 
whereas Odeck (2004) revealed a more modest mean cost overrun of 7.9%.  Using the budget at 88 
the time of the decision to build as reference point, as advocated by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), will 89 
naturally lead to an overinflated cost overrun value, as the initial budget would not include the cost 90 
the project’s new characteristics and changed scope that is included when project information has 91 
become sufficiently detailed not to trigger any great variability (Allen Consulting and the 92 
University of Melbourne, 2007).  93 
 94 
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Most large publicly funded projects tend to go through a long definition period after project 95 
inception during which many changes to scope and accompanying costs occur. It would seem 96 
misleading in some cases to make direct comparisons between the initial estimate at the ‘time of 97 
decision-to-build’ and that at project completion, particularly if the estimate at the ‘time of 98 
decision-to-build’ is only based only on a conceptual design (Love et al., 2015b). As suggested by 99 
Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014b), a more robust explanation of a cost overrun would need to 100 
factor-in process and product, as well as changes to scope and specification. With changes in scope, 101 
the fees of consultants may increase as well. Consequently, this may lead to the pre-construction 102 
phase incurring significant cost growth (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014b).  A point to also 103 
consider is that there is often a tendency for Governments to anchor themselves to the initial budget 104 
estimate and subsequently inform the public of the estimated cost of a project without providing 105 
any form of proviso. The time between the establishment of the initial budget and the letting of 106 
contracts for construction may be lengthy; prices of materials and labor can increase. Moreover, 107 
as more information becomes readily available during the design process scope may change, which 108 
can also lead to increases in cost.   109 
 110 
2.2 Schools of Thought on Cost Overrun Causation  111 
Two predominant schools–of-thought have emerged from the on-going discourse regarding the 112 
sources of cost overruns (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014).   These are the ‘Evolution Theorists’ 113 
who suggest that overruns are the result of changes in project scope and definition between 114 
inception stage and eventual project completion (e.g., Odeyinka et al., 2012).  Sometimes scope 115 
changes may account for up to 90% of what are traditionally called ‘overruns’ (Auditor General 116 
of Western Australia, 2012).  The other school-of-thought, is the ‘Psycho Strategists’ (i.e., which 117 
is a combination of psychological contributors and business strategy) attribute overruns to 118 
deception, planning fallacy and unjustifiable optimism in the setting of initial cost targets (e.g., 119 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Siemiatycki, 2009). Figure 1 combines these two approaches to provide an 120 
overview of cost overrun causation (Figure 1).   121 
 122 
There has been a widespread campaign by the ‘Psycho Strategists’ that optimism bias (i.e. the 123 
underestimation of risks and overestimation of benefits) and strategic misrepresentation (i.e. 124 
deception) can adequately explain why transportation infrastructure projects experience cost 125 
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overruns. While on face value there may be grounds for this argument, the evidence presented 126 
lacks credibility and is unscientific; no proof of any causal relationship is provided (Love et al., 127 
2012; Love et al., 2015a).  Osland and Strand (2010) have been particularly critical of the research 128 
presented in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), as they conclude that they applied the logic of suspicion in 129 
their claim that inaccurate cost forecasting is a result of optimism bias and strategic 130 
misrepresentation.  They specifically state, “Flyvbjerg and other proponents for the hermeneutics 131 
of suspicion, the actors actually admitting telling lies can be seen as the tip of the iceberg. However, 132 
it is also a perspective that would not be falsified if no examples of actors admitting lying were 133 
found.  On the contrary, it could easily be interpreted as a verification that they were lying also for 134 
the researchers.” (Osland and Strand, 2010: p.81). 135 
 136 
Contrastingly, in support of the ‘Psycho Strategists’, which focuses on specific planned actions, 137 
Love et al. (2012) suggests that cost overruns arise as a result of a series of pathogenic influences, 138 
which lay dormant within the project system as denoted in Figure 1.  However, before such 139 
influences become apparent, participants often remain unaware of the impact that particular 140 
decisions, practices and procedures can have on project performance. Pathogens can arise because 141 
of strategic decisions taken by senior management or key decision- makers. Such decisions may 142 
be mistaken in the form of optimism bias, but they also may be deliberate in the form of strategic 143 
misrepresentation or a political/economic decision; this is represented by the Psycho Strategist’s 144 
‘outside’ view presented in Figure 1.  Latent conditions can lay dormant within a system for a 145 
considerable period of time and thus become an integral part of everyday work practices. 146 
Meanwhile once they combine with active failures, then omission errors can arise and their 147 
consequences may be result in safety incidents and/or rework, which can contribute to an increase 148 
in project costs (Figure 1).  149 
 150 
Active failures are essentially unsafe acts (or those of an inappropriate nature) that are committed 151 
by people who are in direct contact with a system. Such acts take the form of errors, which include: 152 
slips, lapses, mistakes and procedural violations. Active failures are often difficult to foresee. As 153 
a result, simply reacting to the event that has occurred cannot eliminate them.  Accordingly, this 154 
school of thought is widely supported by authors such as Odeck (2004) and Odeyinka et al (2012). 155 
Essentially, Love et al. (2012) and Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014) conclude from their research 156 
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that cost overruns are not really a case of ‘projects not going according to plan (budget)’, but ‘plans 157 
not going according to project’.   158 
 159 
While Love et al. (2012) have been critical of the research promulgated by Flyvbjerg (2002), in 160 
recent works, Love et al. (2015a) acknowledges that political, economic, psychological and 161 
managerial factors may influence the generation of pathogenic influences (i.e. latent conditions) 162 
that may arise in projects. Subsequently, Love et al. (2015a) have advocated for a ‘balanced 163 
approach’ that focuses on how process and technological innovations can be used to improve the 164 
cost performance of infrastructure projects. Fundamentally, understanding ‘why’ and ‘how’ 165 
projects overrun, from both ‘Psycho Strategist’ and ‘Evolution Theorists’ perspectives, is pivotal 166 
to reducing their impact and occurrence; Figure 1 provides an overview of cost overrun causation 167 
(Figure 1).  The absence of theory has hindered the development of a ‘balanced approach’, which 168 
can explain and be used to reliably predict cost overruns.  Noteworthy cost overruns do not only 169 
materialize due to change orders, and rework as identified in Figure 1, but also due to safety 170 
incidents that may occur as a result of these events.  For example, Love et al. (2015b,c) revealed 171 
that when a rework event occurred during construction, the propensity for safety incidents to 172 
materialize significantly increased, as well as project costs.  173 
 174 
In an attempt to predict the occurrence of a cost overrun for road projects, Love et al. (2014) 175 
ascertained using a ‘best fit’ probability distribution from an empirical distribution, and revealed 176 
that a continuous Generalised Logistic Probability Density Function was the most appropriate to 177 
use; though, a major shortcoming of this work is that the sample size was small and limited to 50 178 
projects.  The determination of the ‘best fit’ probability distribution provides a reliable estimate of 179 
risk and ensures the effectiveness of the decision-making process (Love et al., 2014b). If an 180 
inappropriate probability distribution is selected, it will be misaligned with the nature of the data 181 
and therefore produce inappropriate results rendering any form of risk analysis undertaken to be 182 
inaccurate and unreliable. Evidence of this can be seen when a Normal Distribution (based upon 183 
the original works of Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) was assumed for predicting the cost contingency for 184 
the Edinburgh Tram System in the United Kingdom.  The project was originally estimated to cost 185 
£320 million, which included a risk contingency based-estimate. 186 
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 188 
Figure 1. Current view(s) of cost overruns in transportation infrastructure projects 189 
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Taking all the available distributional information into account, by considering a reference class 190 
of comparable rail projects (e.g. London Docklands Light Rail); the reference class estimated an 191 
80th percentile value of £400 million (Auditor General for Scotland and Accounts Commission, 192 
2011).  The project was completed three years late in the summer of 2014 at a reported construction 193 
cost of £776 million (City of Edinburgh Council, 2014). Considering claims and contractual 194 
disputes, which partly occurred due to errors and omissions in contract documentation, a revised 195 
estimated final cost of over £1 billion has been forecasted, including £228 million interest 196 
payments on a 30-year loan to cover the funding shortfall.   197 
 198 
Despite the use of an inappropriate probability distribution, Reference Class Forecasting (RCF), 199 
propagated by Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004), has a number of other limitations such lack of large 200 
heterogeneous samples, scarcity of project types, and an over reliance on the dependence of 201 
singular causal factors to derive the estimated uplift (Liu and Napier, 2009; Liu et al., 2010; Love 202 
et al. 2015d).  The interdependency that prevails between causal variables and subsequent coupling 203 
of risks that materialise are negated under this approach.  Thus, the accuracy and reliability of RCF 204 
to be able to assess a risk of a cost overrun (using a percentage up-lift), which is added to estimate 205 
as a risk contingency is questionable, especially considering the example of the Edinburgh Tram 206 
System project.  Surprisingly, this limitation has not been identified in the extant literature, yet 207 
RCF is being used and advocated by several governments throughout Europe. It is suggested that 208 
if RCF is solely relied upon to determine the issues over and above the estimated ‘contingency for 209 
transportation projects, then Government’s will continue to inaccurately forecast construction 210 
costs. 211 
 212 
2.3 Moving from Independent to Interdependent Causes 213 
There has been a proclivity for studies to explain the cause of cost overruns as ‘independent’ rather 214 
‘interdependent’ causal influences within the transportation literature (e.g., Cantarelli, 2010; 215 
Verjweij et al., 2015).  While such studies have attempted to provide a context to explain ‘why’ 216 
and ‘how’ cost overruns arose, the views of those participants involved in the chain of events that 217 
lead to their occurrence are generally limited to specific points in time. Thus, the determination of 218 
causation is narrowly and superficially defined, which potentially leads to an innate bias being 219 
reported (Ahiaga-Dagbui et al, 2015). Furthermore, researchers have sought to pinpoint a single 220 
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‘root cause’ for a cost overrun and then suggest that an intervention to change and/or prevents its 221 
occurrence (e.g. Rosenfeld, 2014). However, ‘the root cause’ often represents the place in a point 222 
of time where a researcher decided to complete their investigation (Dekker, 2006).  The use of the 223 
singular, independent-cause identification approaches have led to inappropriate risk assessments 224 
for cost overrun to be developed; the interdependency between causal variables has not been 225 
effectively considered and accommodated. Cost overruns seldom occur as a result of a stand-alone 226 
cause. Even though they may superficially appear to be different, the causes of poor performance 227 
in infrastructure projects are interwoven and form a complex network. The is therefore a need to 228 
move beyond simply developing lists or ranks of independent factors to understanding dynamic 229 
connections between various causal factors and how they materialise during the course of a project 230 
(Ahiaga-Dagbui, et al., 2015; Love et al., 2016). Failure to adequately understand and 231 
accommodate this inherent interdependency can led to the development of sub-optimal solutions 232 
for mitigating cost overruns; for example RCF does not accommodate the coupling of risks that 233 
can contribute to increasing a project’s cost.  234 
 235 
Techniques such as System Dynamics (SD) have been used extensively to model the 236 
interdependencies between causal variables of cost overruns (e.g., Reichelt and Lynies, 1999; Eden 237 
et al. 2005; Parvan et al., 2015). The causal loop diagrams that emerge are invariably derived from 238 
interview data whereby memory and judgment are relied upon to give an account of what 239 
transpired. Thus, conditional statements are used to create an association or determine an influence 240 
and while plausible, the issue of causation remains an unaddressed issue (Love et al., 2016). 241 
Moreover, a lack of real-life industry data to create and simulate the dynamic nature of cost 242 
overruns using stock-flows also diminishes the accuracy, validity and reliability of SD models 243 
(Tombesi, 2000). Considering that cost overruns have become an innate feature of transportation 244 
infrastructure projects, it is now time to remedy this issue and develop a cost overrun theory of 245 
causation that recognizes the interdependency that prevails within causal claims. 246 
 247 
3. Toward a Probabilistic Theory of Causation 248 
The development of such a theory should be able to explain and predict the occurrence of cost 249 
overruns thus accommodate risk and uncertainty that can emerge in projects.  However, in the case 250 
of potential ‘unknown, unknown’ causes (also referred to as Black Swans) cannot be predicted 251 
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using Bayesian decision theory (Feduzi and Runde, 2014).   According to Feduzi and Runde (2014) 252 
the problem of uncovering ‘unknown unknowns is connected with the practicalities of ‘state space 253 
construction’; that is, “the activities of generating, evaluating and a then accepting or rejecting 254 
candidate hypotheses about how the world might turn out” (p.281).  Prior to the introduction a way 255 
forward in the development of a theory for cost overrun causation, it should be acknowledged that 256 
there are many competing theories of causation in the philosophical and wider literature, but in 257 
this paper probabilistic causation is the focus as it can characterize the relationship between cause 258 
(C) and effect (E) using the tools of probability theory; causes change the probabilities of their 259 
effects.  Under the auspices of a probabilistic theory decision-makers could be confronted with 260 
alternatives involving risk and may invariably need to rely on the use of probabilities rather than 261 
heuristics when making a prediction of a cost overrun.  This is supported by Kahneman and 262 
Tversky (1982) who have distinguished between two modes of judgement during decision-making 263 
under uncertainty: (1) a singular mode that generates an “inside view”, which is subjective in 264 
nature and based on heuristics and biases; (2) a distributional mode that generates an “outside 265 
view” based on aleatory sides of probability (p.518). 266 
 267 
In contrast to popular belief within the transportation infrastructure literature, it should be 268 
acknowledged that probability theory might not be sufficient in this case to assist with predicting 269 
cost overruns.  According to Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) 270 
people can use smart heuristics, that is, rules of thumb to make decisions when minimal 271 
information is provided to them.  Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) have proffered that heuristics 272 
should not lead decision-makers to conceive of human thinking as riddled with irrational cognitive 273 
biases, but rather to consider rationality as an adaptive tool that is not identical to the rules of 274 
formal logic or probability calculus.  Yet, the use of probability calculus has become a norm when 275 
conducting risk analysis for infrastructure projects (e.g., Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004; Signor et al., 276 
2015); an alternative is to use frequency formats that they are expressed as Bayesian algorithms, 277 
which have been identified as being computationally simpler to calculate (Gigerenzer and 278 
Hoffrage, 1995). A thorough discussion of decision making under uncertainty using the laws of 279 
probabilities (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;1982) or bounded rationality by employing 280 
heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer and Murray, 1987; Kruger et al., 1987; Gigerenzer and Reinhard, 2002) 281 
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is outside the scope of this paper. However, probability and heuristics via the use of frequencies 282 
can be incorporated within a theory of probabilistic causation and used to predict a cost overrun.  283 
 284 
3.1 Simpson’s Paradox: From Statistical to Causal Reasoning 285 
A caveat, however, is that if frequency data is used, then possible emergence of Simpson’s Paradox 286 
needs to borne in mind (Simpson, 1951; Pearl, 2009).  It refers to a phenomenon whereby the 287 
association between a pair of variables (X,Y) reverses sign upon conditioning of a third variable 288 
(Z), regardless of the value Z takes when data is divided into subpopulations, each representing a 289 
specific value of the third variable (Z) (Pearl, 2014:p.8).  The phenomenon appears as sign reversal 290 
between the associations measured in the disaggregated subpopulations relative to the aggregated 291 
data, which describes the population as whole. 292 
 293 
Path analysis and structural equation methods have been used extensively for analyzing causal 294 
systems that have direct and indirect effects on other variables, but are also prone to experiencing 295 
Simpson’s Paradox (Kock, 2015).  A simple example, derived from Kock (2015), is used to 296 
demonstrate this phenomenon for public sector clients and the like within the context of variables 297 
that have been found to contribute to cost overruns in the transportation projects.  It is assumed 298 
that data from 500 road projects is collected for two variables: ‘degree of quality assurance of the 299 
cost estimate’ provided by an external consultant to government (X) (Odeck et al., 2015) and the 300 
extent of a cost overrun (Z).  In Figure 2a a two variable path model representing this relationship 301 
is presented. As this path model contains only two variables, then pzx = rzx =0.5; where pzx and rzx 302 
denote the path coefficient and the correlation between the two variables.  In Figure 2b an 303 
additional variable is introduced which is directed at Z: the degree of errors contained in the Bill 304 
of Quantities (BoQ) (Y).  The BoQ can be used to ensure the accuracy of the cost estimate prior 305 
to the commencement of construction; hence the link X → Y. The addition of the new variable led 306 
to the path coefficient pzx for the link between variables ‘degree of quality assurance of the cost 307 
estimate’ (X) and ‘cost overrun’ (Z) to assume a negative value (-0.2), in contrast with the positive 308 
correlation rzx (0.5). This sign reversal characterizes Simpson’s Paradox in a path model (Kock, 309 
2015).  310 
 311 
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 312 
 313 
Figure 2. Path model demonstrating Simpson’s Paradox 314 
 315 
Attempts to address Simpson’s Paradox had been widespread, which led Lindley and Novick 316 
(1981) to conclude that there was no statistical criterion that could be used to forewarn someone 317 
from drawing the wrong conclusions or indicating which data represented the correct answer.  318 
Acknowledging the need to combat this problem, Pearl (1993) has shown that this statistical 319 
irregularity has causal roots and that the determination of the correct answer is insensitive to 320 
temporal information.  Thus, Pearl (2009; 2014) used causal reasoning (i.e., ability to identify 321 
causality: the relationship between a cause and its effect, C→E) to legitimize the cause-effect 322 
relationship through the use of graphical condition referred to as ‘back door’ (i.e., non-causal path 323 
between two variables).  Pearl (2009; 2014) trace causal paths using a Directed Acyclic Graph 324 
(DAG), which is used to assure that spurious paths are intercepted by the third variable; in doing 325 
so, Pearl (2014) has announced that Simpson’s Paradox is now resolved using causal reasoning.  326 
Pearl (2014) points out that Simpson’s Paradox “is a reminder of how easy it is to fall into a web 327 
of paradoxical conclusions when relying solely on intuition, unaided by rigorous statistical 328 
methods (p.8) 329 
13 
 
3.2 Probabilistic Causation 330 
Causality (also referred to as causation) governs the relationship between events and as such has 331 
been at the heart of philosophy since Aristotle.  A plethora of theories of causality have evolved 332 
(e.g., Hume, 1896; Russell, 1913; Gasking, 1955; Lewis, 1973; McDermott, 1995; Ramachandran, 333 
1997; Nordoff, 1999).  According to Williamson (2009) philosophical theories of causation can be 334 
categorized according to the way they answer a range of questions such as: (a) Are causal relata 335 
single-case or generic? (b) Is there a physical connection between the cause and effect or is it a 336 
feature of an individual’s epistemic state? And (c) Does the theory in question attempt to 337 
understand actual or potential causality? 338 
 339 
The philosophy of causation, however, has been typically dominated by advocates of a causal 340 
mechanical view (e.g., Salmon, 1984, Salmon, 2000), those that take a counterfactual stand, which 341 
have been based primarily upon the work of Lewis (1973), and dualists, who seek to combine both 342 
the aforementioned perspectives (e.g., Hall, 2004).  These theoretical viewpoints have tended to 343 
conceptually analyse casual claims in an everyday language and the metaphysical issues of 344 
causation (Weber, 2009).  Yet, to analyse how causation functions in science requires the use of a 345 
probabilistic approach (Weber, 2009). 346 
 347 
Fundamentally, probabilistic theories of causality aim to characterise or analyse causality in terms 348 
of probabilistic dependencies.  Such theories try to provide probabilistic criteria for determining 349 
whether A causes B maintaining that causality just is the corresponding pattern of probabilistic 350 
relationship (Williamson, 2009).  A wealth of probabilistic theories have been proposed over the 351 
last century, with the most notable philosophers laying its foundations being Reichenbach (1923), 352 
Good (1959), Suppres (1970), Humphreys (1989) and Eells (1991).  According to Williamson 353 
(2009) probabilistic theories that have been developed focus on the following key elements: “(a) 354 
changing a cause makes a difference to its effects, and (b) this difference –making shows up in 355 
probabilistic dependencies” (p.187).  In addition, proponents of probabilistic theories have also 356 
maintained that probabilistic dependencies characterise the causal relation; that is, “provide the 357 
necessary and sufficient condition for causal connection of the form: C causes E if and only if 358 
appropriate probabilistic dependencies obtain” (Williamson, 2009:p.187).  359 
 360 
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A detailed critique of the probabilistic theories of causation can be found in Williamson (2009), 361 
Weber (2009) and with additional limitations regarding counterfactuals and pre-emption being 362 
addressed in Noordorf (1999).  However, the specific limitations are briefly presented and brought 363 
to the fore, which include the discounting of mechanistic evidence and context unanimity.  For 364 
example, Suppres (1970) assumed genuine probabilistic causes are prima facie (i.e., a first 365 
appearance) and not spurious.  A prima facie cause is defined when (Suppres, 1970; p.12): 366 
 367 
The event Bt is a prima facia cause of event At, if and only if: 368 
 369 
t’ < t 370 
P(Bt’) >0 371 
P(At│Bt’) > P(At) 372 
 373 
Furthermore, spurious causes are defined as: 374 
 375 
An event Bt’is a spurious cause in the sense of At, if and only if, Bt is a prima facie cause of At and 376 
there is a t’’ < t’ and an event Ct” such that:  377 
 378 
P(Bt’Ct’’) > 0, 379 
P(At│Bt’Ct’’) > P(At│Ct’’), 380 
P(At│Bt’Ct’’) ≥ (At│Bt’) 381 
 382 
Suppres (1971) answers the question “What do probabilistic chains mean?” and reveals that 383 
presence and absence of statistical relevance relations in the real world.  For policy makers, such 384 
as Government, they would be supplied with causal knowledge and with no explicit link between 385 
causation and policy, as it refers to the real world and not the hypothetical that they like to create.  386 
In addition, mechanistic evidence is discounted when probabilistic evidence is introduced.  Here 387 
specific information (probabilistic dependencies) is used to define the meaning of causation 388 
(Weber, 2009). 389 
 390 
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Eells (1991) also defines causation in terms of positive statistical relevance, and thus faced a 391 
similar problem to Suppres (1971). However, Eells (1991) introduced the concept of context 392 
unanimity whereby a cause must raise the probability of its effect in every background context.  393 
Thus Eells (1991) states: “X is a positive causal factor for Y if and only if, for each i, Pr(Y│Ki&X) 394 
> Pr(Y│Ki& ~X). Negative causal factorhood and neutrality are defined by changing the “always 395 
rises” (>) idea t0 “always lowers” (<) and “always leaves unchanged” (=), respectively.  The idea 396 
that the inequality or equality must hold for each of the background contexts Ki. (p.86). The 397 
characteristic property of causes here is unable to be reversed (from positive to negative) or 398 
overpowered (from positive or negative to casually neutral) in a subpopulation.  Bearing this this 399 
in mind Governments (who are policy-makers), for example, are only concerned with average 400 
effects of cost overruns on their projects, not the causes in the sense of context unanimity.  In 401 
summary, governments would be interested in likelihood of a project experiencing a cost overrun 402 
and not necessarily the specific causes that would potentially arise.   403 
 404 
To establish a causal claim, there is a need for mutual support of both mechanisms and 405 
dependencies (Russo and Williamson, 2007); this view is referred to by Weber (2009) as evidential 406 
pluralism.  It has been proposed by Russo and Williamson (2007) that to establish a causal claim 407 
two things are required: (1) a cause makes a difference to the effect, and (2) that there is a 408 
mechanism from cause to effect.  In the case of being able to establish a causal claim for cost 409 
overruns, the evidence-based medicine can be drawn upon, whereby both mechanistic (bottom-up 410 
evidence) and probabilistic evidence is required to substantiate a causal claim.  Glennan (1996) 411 
states a mechanism underlying behaviour is a complex system, which produces that behaviour by 412 
the interaction of a number of parts to direct causal laws (p.52).  The inclusion of such a mechanism 413 
in a theory of probabilistic causation for cost overruns is deemed to be necessary as it can 414 
accommodate the social system and subsequent interactions that invariably prevail within project 415 
environments used to deliver transportation infrastructure.  Sources of evidence of mechanisms 416 
may include direct observation, experiments, statistical analysis, documentary sources, simulation, 417 
and experience (Clarke et al., 2014).  Figure 3 categorizes of evidence of mechanisms linking an 418 
assumed cause (C) with effect (E) are presented (Clarke et al., 2014).   419 
 420 
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 421 
(Adapted from Russo, 2014) 422 
 423 
Figure 3. Categories of evidence of mechanism  424 
 425 
In the first instance, the evidence of mechanism explicitly indicates that provided is relevant.  For 426 
example, it has been widely demonstrated that there is a correlation between change orders and 427 
cost increases in projects (e.g., Bordat et al., 2004); this is not to say that such statistical analysis 428 
should be solely replied upon, but it can provide a high degree of confidence that C →E.  In the 429 
second instance, presented in Figure 2, there is an initial reason to believe that C →E, for example 430 
a drawing error contributes to a change order but whether error was created by an architect or 431 
structural engineer is difficult to determine as it could appear on both sets of drawings that were 432 
created.  Interrogation of correspondence and documentation would reveal why and how the cause 433 
originated.  Such a process, however, should not be about apportioning blame but understanding 434 
why it occurred and assessing the likelihood it would occur again, even if an intervention strategy 435 
were introduced.  In the final example evidence of mechanism is self-explanatory, there is no 436 
mechanism, but it is important to acknowledge as it can be used to define the space of possible 437 
mechanisms of action and the likely causal relations between C and E.   438 
 439 
Ultimately, whether a causal claim is accepted or not is dependent on the quality of evidence that 440 
can be accumulated and underlying reasoning between causal connections. Commencing the 441 
evidence gathering process from a tactical level (i.e., bottom-up) can provide assumptions and 442 
insights about the rational/or non-ration decision-making that determine the behaviour of people 443 
that lead to events where a cost increase was incurred.  The established assumptions can be used 444 
to infer causal relations on the higher level (i.e. operational).   445 
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4. Future Research 446 
Probabilistic causal inferences about cost overruns can be acquired from a combination of 447 
assumptions, experiments and data.  But, the challenge for researchers addressing this pervasive 448 
and complex problem has been the lack of a formal language that can be used to explicate, 449 
determine, and predict their occurrence.  Causal graphical models have been advocated as a 450 
formalism for learning and reasoning about causal relationships (e.g. Pearl, 2009).  Such models 451 
are often referred to as Bayesian Networks (BN) and provide a means of specifying the causal 452 
relationships that hold among a set of variables.  A central feature of BN is the DAG that provides 453 
an intuitive representation for the causal structure relating to a set of variables. An example of 454 
DAG and a simple example of how a cost increase arises due to result of errors in BoQ and 455 
drawings, which lead to a change order is presented in Figure 4.  In this instance both mechanisms 456 
and dependencies could be used to construct a DAG, but the nature of relationships is not defined; 457 
they can be deterministic or probabilistic. Moreover, multiple causes of an effect can act 458 
independently or strongly interact.   459 
 460 
Determining the nature relationship between variables to establish a causal claim is an issue that 461 
needs to be considered when developing a theory for cost overrun causation; essentially this is an 462 
epistemological issue, which can be addressed through evidence of mechanisms (Clarke et al., 463 
2014). Another consideration to be borne in mind when establishing a causal claim is 464 
methodological; that is, the evidence-gathering methods to be used.  Consideration of the type of 465 
information and how it is collected needs to be made with specific emphasis being placed on 466 
establishing causal claims within a project.  A major limitation of previous cost overrun research 467 
that has examined causation in transportation infrastructure projects has been its emphasis on the 468 
creation of causal claims from heterogeneous samples.   469 
 470 
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Here there are four two-valued variables, A, B, C, D. A BN 
can be formed by taking the DAG of and specifying the 
probability distribution of each variable conditional on its 
parents: 
 
2.0)( 1 aP , 8.0)( 0 aP  
7.0)( 1 bP , 3.0)( 0 bP  
4.0)( 111 bacP , 6.0)( 110 bacP  
5.0)( 101 bacP , 5.0)( 100 bacP  
2.0)( 011 bacP , 8.0)( 010 bacP  
3.0)( 001 bacP , 7.0)( 000 bacP  
8.0)( 11 cdP , 2.0)( 10 cdP  
6.0)( 01 cdP , 4.0)( 00 cdP  
 
In this instance, 
 
          0144.011011011101  cdPbacPbPaPdcbaP  
 
Figure 4. Hypothetical example of a DAG for a cost increase 471 
 472 
This aggregation of data has resulted in a high degree of causal ambiguity and limited 473 
understanding about causal inferences of cost overruns within the extant transportation literature.  474 
Future research therefore should place emphasis on deconstructing what is already known about 475 
the causal nature of cost overruns to arrive at point where the ‘noise’ within the data is reduced 476 
and causal reasoning can be applied.  From a practical perspective, this poses a major challenge, 477 
as more often than not access is restricted to organizations and participants within a project due to 478 
commercially sensitive reasons. The challenge here is for researchers to actively engage with 479 
government and organizations to ensure that they are able to capture the ‘practice’ that contributes 480 
to cost overruns.  To understand the nomological context of cost overruns that may prevail, it is 481 
suggested that ‘sensemaking’ (e.g., Wieck et al, 1988, 1993; 1995; Goh et al., 2012) form the 482 
epistemological underpinning used to derive causal inferences.  Here ‘sensemaking’ can be used 483 
as process to ensure evidence of mechanism, as people can provide meaning to experience through 484 
the ‘practice’ used to deliver projects.  Notwithstanding, there are several broad philosophical 485 
questions that need to be explored about their causal reasoning of cost overruns.   486 
 487 
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Drawing on the work of Claveau (2013:p.122) the following questions are proposed: (1) What are 488 
the meaning of causal chains? Here the inferential relationships between events are determined. 489 
(2) How can causal chains be supported by evidence?  This is necessary considering the multiple 490 
parties involved in a project and the complexity of relationships that exist. (3) How are causal 491 
beliefs affected by new information (e.g., with the advent of BIM, how will beliefs be influenced)?  492 
Once a causal chain is established and new information is made available, will the underlying 493 
dynamics of it change? Addressing such questions will provide the seeding for the development 494 
of a theory for cost overrun causation. 495 
 496 
5. Conclusion 497 
Transportation infrastructure is pivotal to improving an economy’s productivity and society’s over 498 
all well-being.  Thus, when cost overruns are experienced this has a direct negative impact on the 499 
economy, and the taxpayer.  Unfortunately cost overruns are a norm rather than an exception; 500 
despite the accumulated knowledge that has sought to explain and predict their occurrence, there 501 
remains limited understanding about their causal nature.  To make decisions and implement risk 502 
mitigation strategies to contain and reduce the likelihood of a cost overrun being experienced, 503 
requires diagnosis – to determine its probable causes.  Research undertaken to date has not been 504 
able to effectively undertake this task regardless of the well-intentioned studies that have been 505 
conducted.   506 
 507 
Hindering this process of knowledge creation has been the absence of ‘theory’ and an 508 
epistemological lens that can enable ‘practice’ to be captured, dissected and put together to develop 509 
causal claims.  In addressing this issue, this paper has suggested that there is a need re-examine 510 
cost overrun from the perspective of pluralistic probabilistic causation so that it can be explained, 511 
predicted and managed.  In particular, it has been promulgated that the use of pluralistic approach 512 
that considers mutual support of both mechanisms and dependencies is required so that ‘practice’ 513 
that arises during the delivery of transportation infrastructure projects can be realized and used to 514 
construct causal graphical models.  Such models provide a formalism for learning and reasoning 515 
about causal relationships that contribute to cost overruns.  It is recognized that the establishment 516 
of such causal relationships will be an arduous process considering the multitude of organizations 517 
involved in delivering transportation infrastructure projects.  If, however, headway is to be made 518 
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in tackling the cost overrun phenomena, then there is a need to acknowledge, understand, and 519 
become immersed in practice rather than cherry picking from it using epistemological and 520 
methodological approaches that are unable to accommodate for the creation of the situational 521 
awareness required to develop the basis for causal claims.  522 
 523 
This paper has not sought to provide a solution but instead sow the seeds for the development of a 524 
theory of probabilistic causation for cost overruns in transportation infrastructure.  A wealth of 525 
research will be required to develop such a theory, but the authors hope that this paper provides a 526 
way forward in this fertile area for Governments to consider in the future policy-making.  527 
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